David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 138 (3):387 - 416 (2004)
In this paper I argue that RadicalInterpretation (RI), taken to be a methodological doctrine regarding the conditions under which an interpretation of an utterance is both warranted and correct, has unacceptable implications for the conditions on (ascriptions of) understanding. The notion of understanding at play is that which underwrites the testimonial transmission of knowledge. After developing this notion I argue that, on the assumption of RI, hearers will fail to have such understanding in situations in which we should want to maintain otherwise. The overall effect of the argument is to provide a heretofore unexamined source of motivation for anti-individualistic approaches to the semantics of utterances.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tomoji Shogenji (2006). A Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs. Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
Sanford Goldberg (2009). Experts, Semantic and Epistemic. Noûs 43 (4):581-598.
Sanford Goldberg (2008). Must Differences in Cognitive Value Be Transparent? Erkenntnis 69 (2):165 - 187.
Eisuke Sakakibara (2010). Conventions and Failure of Communication. Kagaku Tetsugaku 43 (1):1-14.
Similar books and articles
Jennifer Lackey (1999). Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):471-490.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2008). Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
Jennifer Lackey (2006). Learning From Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.
Jennifer Lackey (2008/2010). Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Dan O'Brien (2007). Testimony and Lies. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):225–238.
Arnon Keren (2007). Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge†. Episteme 4 (3):368-381.
Benjamin McMyler (2007). Knowing at Second Hand. Inquiry 50 (5):511 – 540.
Charlie Pelling (2013). Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
Joachim Horvath (2008). Testimony, Transmission, and Safety. Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.
Joshue Orozco (2010). I Can Trust You Now … but Not Later: An Explanation of Testimonial Knowledge in Children. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (2):195-214.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #59,400 of 1,100,004 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #33,390 of 1,100,004 )
How can I increase my downloads?