Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230 (2009)
|Abstract||Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precisioncrafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties of externalism as well. Roush advances both a theory of knowledge and a theory of evidence; I focus entirely on knowledge. I shall pinpoint a few respects in which Roush’s theory is not wholly successful. In particular, it works less well than process- (or method-) oriented externalisms like process reliabilism. Nozick’s initial tracking account of knowledge was formulated as follows|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Adam Thompson (1986). Counterexamples to Nozick's Account of Transmission of Knowledge Via Proof. Philosophy Research Archives 12:261-265.
Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright (forthcoming). Does Roush Show That Evidence Should Be Probable? Synthese.
Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.
Ben Bronner (2012). Problems with the Dispositional Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):505-507.
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2007). Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
Lars Gundersen (2010). Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis. Erkenntnis 72 (3).
Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sherrilyn Roush (2007). Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-06-28
Total downloads56 ( #17,771 of 549,012 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,289 of 549,012 )
How can I increase my downloads?