David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 61 (3):347-361 (2007)
I argue that it is possible, in the right circumstances, to see what the kind thing is to do: in the right circumstances, we can, literally, see deontic facts, as well as facts about others’ emotional states, and evaluative facts. In arguing for this, I will deploy a notion of non‐inferential perceptual belief or judgement according to which the belief or judgement is arrived at non‐inferentially in the phenomenological sense and yet is inferential in the epistemic sense. The ability to arrive at these kinds of beliefs and judgements is part of virtue, and is also part of what it is to grasp thick ethical concepts in an engaged way. When we come to thinner evaluative and deontic facts and thinner ethical concepts, however, the requirements for non‐inferential perceptual belief and judgement are less easily met. Seeing what is the kind thing to do is one matter; seeing what is the right thing to do is another
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Goldie (2000/2002). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press.
Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (1979). Virtue and Reason. The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Citations of this work BETA
Sabine A. Döring (2007). Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
Heather Battaly (2008). Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
Fabrice Teroni (2007). Emotions and Formal Objects. Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth. Inquiry 53 (6):602-626.
Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Similar books and articles
Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
Stephen Leighton (2002). Jerome Neu, A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion:A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion. Ethics 112 (4):846-848.
Louis Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
Ross Buck (2002). “Choice” and “Emotion” in Altruism: Reflections on the Morality of Justice Versus the Morality of Caring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):254-255.
David Pugmire (2002). Narcissism in Emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):313-326.
Paul E. Griffiths (2004). Is Emotion a Natural Kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
Peter Goldie (2011). Grief: A Narrative Account. Ratio 24 (2):119-137.
Charland Louis C. (2010). Reinstating the Passions: Arguments From the History of Psychopathology. In Goldie Peter (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press 237-263.
Mikko Salmela (2011). Can Emotion Be Modelled on Perception? Dialectica 65 (1):1-29.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads227 ( #11,154 of 1,796,216 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #51,296 of 1,796,216 )
How can I increase my downloads?