David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):507 - 524 (2008)
While objective values need not be intrinsically motivating, need not actually motivate us, they would determine what we ought to pursue and protect. They would provide reasons for actions. Objective values would come in degrees, and more objective value would provide stronger reasons. It follows that, if objective value exists, we ought to maximize it in the world. But virtually no one acts with that goal in mind. Furthermore, objective value would exist independently of our subjective valuings. But we have no way of measuring amounts of such values independently of the ways we value objects. While a subjectivist can account for mistaken values, a fully impersonal viewpoint, from which objective values would appear, seems instead to cause all values to disappear. Nor does the moral point of view, which requires more impartiality than agents usually exhibit, reveal fully objective values. The paper closes with an examination of the most widely endorsed candidates for states having positive and negative objective values: pleasures and pains. It concludes again that, once we adjust for worthiness of the object and desert of the subject for such states, there is no way to measure their supposed objective value.
|Keywords||Objective value Values Reasons|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis (2011). Insurance of Techno-Organizational Ventures and Procedural Ethics: Lessons From the Deepwater Horizon Explosion. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 103 (S1):45-61.
Similar books and articles
Gebhard Geiger (1992). Why There Are No Objective Values: A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism From an Evolutionary Point of View. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):315-330.
Iii Holmes Rolston (1981). Values in Nature. Environmental Ethics 3 (2):113-128.
Rolston (1981). Values in Nature. Environmental Ethics 3 (2):113-128.
E. J. Bond (1983). Reason and Value. Cambridge University Press.
Sandra G. Harding (1978). Four Contributions Values Can Make to the Objectivity of Social Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:199 - 209.
Christine Vitrano (2013). Meaningful Lives? Ratio 26 (1):79-90.
Gebhard Geiger (1995). Why Are There No Objective Values? A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism From an Epistemological Point of View. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):35 - 62.
Andrei Marmor (2001). Positive Law and Objective Values. Clarendon Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads103 ( #10,602 of 1,101,656 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #35,000 of 1,101,656 )
How can I increase my downloads?