Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):1-14 (2002)
|Abstract||People support ethical antirealism with various arguments. Gilbert Harman thinks if a property of goodness existed, it would have detectable effects on objects that have it. However, Harman reasons, the good has no such detectable effects. Internalists think if good objects had some goodness property, that property would bond to desire and action in a way inconsistent with ethical realism. I defend ethical realism from the two arguments. I explain how good can both name a property and how objects with that property might dispose people to seek them. This explanation of the good's magnetism provides a reply to Harman.|
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