David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio Juris 16 (4):450-468 (2003)
The principle of bivalence is the assertion that every statement is either true or else false. Its legal analog, however, must be formulated relative to particular legal systems and in terms of validity rather than truth. It asserts that every statement of law that can be formulated in the vocabulary of a given legal system is valid or else invalid in that system. A line of New York cases is traced, beginning with Thomas v. Winchester . This case, which involved a poison mislabeled as a medicine, established an exception to the rule that a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote purchaser. The court made an exception because a poison is an “imminently dangerous” thing. How far may this exception be applied to other fact‐situations? Some subsequent cases are examined, and it is considered whether there is no correct answer in these instances and, more dramatically, whether more than one correct answer is tenable. In either event the legal analog of bivalence would seem to fail
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Cheryl Misak (1990). Pragmatism and Bivalence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):171 – 179.
Timothy Williamson (1988). Bivalence and Subjunctive Conditionals. Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421.
Russell Trenholme (1994). Analog Simulation. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):115-131.
John Haugeland (1981). Analog and Analog. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):213-226.
Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282.
Michael C. Rea (2006). Presentism and Fatalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.
Eugeniusz Żabski (1997). O zasadach dwuwartościowości, sprzeczności i wyłączonego środka uwag parę. Filozofia Nauki 4.
Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.
Bruce J. MacLennan (1993). Grounding Analog Computers. Philosophical Explorations 2:8-51.
Peter Pagin (1998). Bivalence: Meaning Theory Vs Metaphysics. Theoria 64 (2-3):157-186.
Kazuyuki Aihara & Jun Kyung Ryeu (2001). Chaotic Neurons and Analog Computation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):810-811.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.
Richard Gaskin (1994). Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (4):551-571.
Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads7 ( #204,162 of 1,413,400 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #154,345 of 1,413,400 )
How can I increase my downloads?