The Sorites is nonsense disguised by a fallacy

Analysis 72 (1):61-65 (2012)
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Abstract

It is uncontroversial that, on any run through a Sorites series, a subject, at some point, switches from an ‘F’ verdict on one exhibit to a non-‘F’ verdict on the next. (Where this ‘cut-off’ point occurs tend to differ from trial to trial.) It is a fallacy to infer that there must be a cut-off point simpliciter between F items and non-F items. The transition is from firm ground to swamp. In the Sorites reasoning, some conditionals of the form ‘If Item n is F, then Item n + 1 is F’ are not false but nonsensical. This solution respects boundarylessness

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Author's Profile

Laurence Goldstein
PhD: University of St. Andrews; Last affiliation: University of Kent

Citations of this work

Material Composition.David Michael Cornell - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Consciousness and cognitive access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
Faultless or Disagreeement.Andrea Iacona - 2008 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 287.

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