The social virtues: Two accounts [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 24 (4):237-248 (2009)
Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are those she herself possesses. A social (or anti-individualistic) account of the social virtues, by contrast, denies one or both of these claims. I will offer some reasons for thinking that the individualistic account is not acceptable, and that one or the other social account provides a better understanding of the social virtues. The argument is not decisive, but it does suggest that the social dimension of social epistemic virtues is not fully characterizable in individualistic terms.
|Keywords||Testimony Social epistemology Virtue epistemology Epistemological individualism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin McMyler (2012). Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Adam Green (2012). Extending the Credit Theory of Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):121 - 132.
Sandy Goldberg (2011). The Division of Epistemic Labor. Episteme 8 (1):112-125.
Mohammed Y. A. Rawwas, Surendra Arjoon & Yusuf Sidani (2013). An Introduction of Epistemology to Business Ethics: A Study of Marketing Middle-Managers. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 117 (3):525-539.
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