Philosophy 55 (July):349-362 (1980)
|Abstract||Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by reason, and hence by what there is reason to choose, seek, and prefer, when they act.|
|Keywords||Desire Ethics Pain Pleasure Reason|
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