David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy 55 (July):349-362 (1980)
Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by reason, and hence by what there is reason to choose, seek, and prefer, when they act.
|Keywords||Desire Ethics Pain Pleasure Reason|
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Citations of this work BETA
Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
Ivar Labukt (2012). Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure. Utilitas 24 (02):172-199.
Kristján Kristjánsson (2008). Hiltonism, Hedonism and the Self. Ethics and Education 3 (1):3-14.
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