A nonmonotonic modal formalization of the logic of acceptance and rejection
Studia Logica 58 (1):113-127 (1997)
| Abstract | The problems we deal with concern reasoning about incomplete knowledge. Knowledge is understood as ability of an ideal rational agent to make decisions about pieces of information. The formalisms we are particularly interested in are Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) and its variant, the logic of acceptance and rejection (AEL2). It is well-known that AEL may be seen as the nonmonotonic KD45 modal logic. The aim is to give an appropriate modal formalization for AEL2. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Johan van Benthem (2004). What One May Come to Know. Analysis 64 (2):95–105.
Lloyd Humberstone (2008). Invitation to Autoepistemology. Theoria 68 (1):13-51.
Henry Prakken (1996). Two Approaches to the Formalisation of Defeasible Deontic Reasoning. Studia Logica 57 (1):73 - 90.
Robert Milnikel (2003). Embedding Modal Nonmonotonic Logics Into Default Logic. Studia Logica 75 (3):377 - 382.
Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2001). Real Logic is Nonmonotonic. Minds and Machines 11 (4):577-595.
Henry E. Kyburg (2001). Real Logic is Nonmonotonic. Minds and Machines 11 (4).
Riccardo Rosati (1999). Reasoning About Minimal Knowledge in Nonmonotonic Modal Logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (2):187-203.
Anna Gomolińska (1998). On the Logic of Acceptance and Rejection. Studia Logica 60 (2):233-251.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads2 ( #232,501 of 549,087 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |

