Do Hodgson's propositions uniquely characterize free will? Commentary on Hodgson's paper on plain person's free will
Journal of Consciousness Studies 12:32-40 (2005)
|Abstract||s view of free will. He also offers detailed justifications that he hopes are philosophically and scientifically respectable. While Hodgson doesn't state anywhere what would count as a "scientifically respectable" proposition, he seems to expect that any scientific theory of consciousness and free will must fully account for his nine propositions, not just explain them away. Or, alternatively, any scientific theory of free will that is incompatible with his nine propositions cannot serve as a possible framework for developing a scientific theory of conscious free will.|
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