Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience

Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300 (2013)
We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
Keywords Kant  Perception  Unperceived Existence
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DOI 10.1515/kant-2013-0020
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