Other minds and perceived identity

Dialectica 63 (2):219-230 (2009)
Abstract
Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
Keywords Other Minds
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References found in this work BETA
Quassim Cassam (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Brie Gertler (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Joel Smith (2010). The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):201-217.
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