What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will?
Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43 (2005)
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| Keywords | Free Will Incompatibilism Metaphysics Person Hodgson, D | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJennifer Trusted (1984). Free Will and Responsibilty. Oxford University Press.
Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.
Derk Pereboom (2002). Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Ravi Gomatam (2005). Do Hodgson's Propositions Uniquely Characterize Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):32-40.
Liberty Jaswal (2005). Isolating Disparate Challenges to Hodgson's Account of Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):43-46.
Ravi Gomatam (2005). Do Hodgson's Propositions Uniquely Characterize Free Will? Commentary on Hodgson's Paper on Plain Person's Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12:32-40.
David Hodgson (2005). A Plain Person's Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):3-19.
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