Choosing expert statistical advice: Practical costs and epistemic justification

Episteme 12 (1):117-129 (2015)
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Abstract

We discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay politician. First, we refine Goldman’s criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in which institutional setting the costs of partiality can play an epistemic role. This way we intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate its epistemic justification.

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Author Profiles

David Teira
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
Javier González De Prado Salas
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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