Reading conflicted minds: An empirical follow-up to Knobe and roedder

Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):193 – 205 (2008)
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Abstract

Recently Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder found that folk attributions of valuing tend to vary according to the perceived moral goodness of the object of value. This is an interesting finding, but it remains unclear what, precisely, it means. Knobe and Roedder argue that it indicates that the concept MORAL GOODNESS is a feature of the concept VALUING. In this article, I present a study of folk attributions of desires and moral beliefs that undermines this conclusion. I then propose the beginnings of an alternative interpretation of the data that appeals to intrinsic biases in our third-person mindreading mechanisms.

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Chad Gonnerman
University of Southern Indiana

References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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