Semántica anti-realista: Intuicionismo matemático Y concepto de verdad
Theoria 5 (1):149-170 (1990)
| Abstract | Among the philosophical problems recently discussed, the question on the anti-realist semantic is outstanding. Its origin arises when M. Dummett tries a Wittgenstenian interpretation of the Intuitionistic Mathematics. He uses the concept of justification as the key concept - understood as proof or verification -, and it faces up to a realistic view centred in the notion of truth. But, carefully analized, it shows a clear vulnerability, while the realistic position has got serious eIements on its favour, and so it is recognized by the supporter of the opposite point of view. Thus, the notion of truth cannot be disregarded | |||||||||
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