The Connection Principle and the Classificatory Scheme of Reality
| Abstract | Searle's Connection Principle says that "the ascription of an unconscious intentional phenomenon to a system implies that the phenomenon is in principle accessible to consciousness". In this paper I want to defend the thesis that Searle's theory of mind, and especially the Connection Principle, does not offer a coherent picture of unconscious mental states and, a fortiori, of the intentional life generally. | |||||||||
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Oscar L. Gonzalez-Castan (1999). The Connection Principle and the Classificatory Scheme of Reality. Teorema 18 (1):85-98.
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