Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 49 (2):251-253 (1982)
|Abstract||It is shown by means of a simple example that a good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the occurrence of that event. It is also shown that this contention follows symbolically if an explanation having higher "explicativity" than another is regarded as better|
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