A pragmatic modification of explicativity for the acceptance of hypotheses

Philosophy of Science 51 (1):120-127 (1984)
The use of a concept called "explicativity", for (provisionally) accepting a theory or Hypothesis H, has previously been discussed. That previous discussion took into account the prior probability of H, and hence implicitly its theoretical simplicity. We here suggest that a modification of explicativity is required to allow for what may be called the pragmatic simplicity of H, that is, the simplicity of using H in applications as distinct from the simplicity of the description of H
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DOI 10.1086/289167
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