Demandingness as a virtue
Journal of Ethics 13 (1):1 - 13 (2009)
| Abstract | Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesIgor Primoratz (ed.) (2007). Politics and Morality. Palgrave Macmillan.
Per Sundman (2000). The Good Manager – a Moral Manager? Journal of Business Ethics 27 (3).
Attila Tanyi (2012). The Case for Authority. In S. Schleidgen (ed.), Should we always act morally? Essays on Overridingness. Tectum.
David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
Timothy Chappell (2007). Integrity and Demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):255 - 265.
Brian McElwee (2011). Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):457-466.
Dale Dorsey (2012). Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality†. Noûs 46 (1):1-23.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads91 ( #7,558 of 549,090 )Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #12,372 of 549,090 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
