Demandingness as a virtue

Journal of Ethics 13 (1):1 - 13 (2009)
Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.
Keywords moral demandingness  moral satisficing
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DOI 10.2307/40345389
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Pogge (2005). World Poverty and Human Rights. Ethics and International Affairs 19 (1):1–7.
Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Susan Wolf (1982). Moral Saints. Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.

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Citations of this work BETA
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2014). Joint Moral Duties. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):58-74.
Holly Lawford-Smith (2013). Non-Ideal Accessibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):653-669.

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