Demandingness as a virtue

Journal of Ethics 13 (1):1 - 13 (2009)
Abstract
Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.
Keywords moral demandingness  moral satisficing
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    References found in this work BETA
    J. L. Austin (1961). A Plea for Excuses' in Austin. In J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.), Philosophical Papers. Clarendon Press.
    Thomas Pogge (2005). Real World Justice. Journal of Ethics 9 (1-2):29 - 53.
    Thomas Pogge (2005). World Poverty and Human Rights. Ethics and International Affairs 19 (1):1–7.

    View all 14 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Holly Lawford-Smith (2013). Non-Ideal Accessibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):653-669.
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