Toward an international rule of law: Distinguishing international law-breakers from would-be law-makers
Journal of Ethics 9 (1-2):225 - 246 (2005)
| Abstract | An interesting fact about customary international law is that the only way you can propose an amendment to it is by breaking it. How can that be differentiated from plain law-breaking? What moral standards might apply to that sort of international conduct? I propose we use ones analogous to the ordinary standards for distinguishing civil disobedients from ordinary law-breakers: would-be law-makers, like civil disobedients, must break the law openly; they must accept the legal consequences of doing so; and they must be prepared to have the same rules applied to them as everyone else. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGeorge P. Fletcher (2007). The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International. Oxford University Press.
Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (eds.) (2010). The Philosophy of International Law. Oxford University Press.
John Arthur & William H. Shaw (eds.) (2010). Readings in the Philosophy of Law. Pearson Prentice Hall.
Jack L. Goldsmith (2007). The Limits of International Law. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads29 ( #42,388 of 549,088 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,088 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
