The Epistemic Benefi ts of Multiple Biased Observers

Episteme 3 (3):166-174 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We know that we can learn much from the reports of multiple competent, independent, unbiased observers. There are also things we can learn from the reports of competent but biased observers. Specifically, when reports go against the grain of an agent’s known biases, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of those reports. Triangulating on the truth via that mechanism requires a multiplicity of observers with distinct biases, each of whose reports might be one-way decisive in that fashion. It also presupposes that all observers share the same fundamental epistemic standards

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-11

Downloads
25 (#540,179)

6 months
1 (#1,027,696)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Goodin
Australian National University

References found in this work

Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):372-374.
From a Logical Point of View.Willard Orman Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.

Add more references