David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 73 (5):688-698 (2006)
Case studies of diverse scientific fields show how scientists use a range of resources to generate new interpretative models and to establish their plausibility as explanations of a domain. They accomplish this by manipulating imagistic representations in particular ways. I show that scientists in different domains use the same basic transformations. Common features of these transformations indicate that general cognitive strategies of interpretation, simplification, elaboration, and argumentation are at work. Social and historical studies of science emphasize the diversity of local contexts of practice. However, the existence of common strategies shows that this diversity masks an important repertoire of cognitive strategies. Scientists use this repertoire to adapt their representations to meet the cognitive demands of different contexts of practice. This paper considers the implications of this finding for the notion of scientists as cognitive agents in distributed knowledge-producing systems.
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References found in this work BETA
K. Knorr-Cetina (1999). Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Andrew Pickering (1995). The Mangle of Practice Time, Agency, and Science. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Davis Baird (2004). Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments. University of California Press.
B. Latour (1986). Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands. Knowledge and Society 6:1--40.
Citations of this work BETA
Mathieu Charbonneau (2013). The Cognitive Life of Mechanical Molecular Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):585-594.
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