Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation

Oxford University Press (2007)
Abstract
Understanding causal structure is a central task of human cognition. Causal learning underpins the development of our concepts and categories, our intuitive theories, and our capacities for planning, imagination and inference. During the last few years, there has been an interdisciplinary revolution in our understanding of learning and reasoning: Researchers in philosophy, psychology, and computation have discovered new mechanisms for learning the causal structure of the world. This new work provides a rigorous, formal basis for theory theories of concepts and cognitive development, and moreover, the causal learning mechanisms it has uncovered go dramatically beyond the traditional mechanisms of both nativist theories, such as modularity theories, and empiricist ones, such as association or connectionism
Keywords Learning, Psychology of  Causation
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Call number BF318.C38 2007
ISBN(s) 0195176804   9780195176803
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    Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
    Nick Chater (2009). Rational Models of Conditioning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):204-205.

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