David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 8 (1):101-118 (1998)
I argue that explanation should be thought of as the phenomenological mark of the operation of a particular kind of cognitive system, the theory-formation system. The theory-formation system operates most clearly in children and scientists but is also part of our everyday cognition. The system is devoted to uncovering the underlying causal structure of the world. Since this process often involves active intervention in the world, in the case of systematic experiment in scientists, and play in children, the cognitive system is accompanied by a theory drive, a motivational system that impels us to interpret new evidence in terms of existing theories and change our theories in the light of new evidence. What we usually think of as explanation is the phenomenological state that accompanies the satisfaction of this drive. However, the relation between the phenomenology and the cognitive system is contingent, as in similar cases of sexual and visual phenomenology. Distinctive explanatory phenomenology may also help us to identify when the theory-formation system is operating.
|Keywords||cognitive development explanation phenomenology science theories|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget (2015). The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
J. D. Trout (2007). The Psychology of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):564–591.
Stephen R. Grimm (2010). The Goal of Explanation. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 41 (4):337-344.
Stephen R. Grimm (2012). The Value of Understanding. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):103-117.
Andrei Cimpian & Ellen M. Markman (2009). Information Learned From Generic Language Becomes Central to Children’s Biological Concepts: Evidence From Their Open-Ended Explanations. Cognition 113 (1):14-25.
Similar books and articles
H. P. P. Lotter (1999). The Complexity of Science. Koers 64 (4):499-520.
Stuart S. Glennan (2005). The Modeler in the Crib. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):217-227.
Linda A. W. Brakel & Howard Shevrin (2003). Freud's Dual Process Theory and the Place of the a-Rational. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):527-528.
Michael Kubovy & Michael Schutz (2010). Audio-Visual Objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):41-61.
Caren A. Frosch, Teresa McCormack, David A. Lagnado & Patrick Burns (2012). Are Causal Structure and Intervention Judgments Inextricably Linked? A Developmental Study. Cognitive Science 36 (2):261-285.
David J. Chalmers (2011). A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2011). Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation. Synthese 183 (3):313-338.
Jordi Fernández (2003). Explanation by Computer Simulation in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 13 (2):269-284.
Michael Wheeler (1998). An Appeal for Liberalism, or Why Van Gelder's Notion of a Dynamical System is Too Narrow for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):653-654.
Fred Adams (2010). Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #72,737 of 1,777,121 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #205,424 of 1,777,121 )
How can I increase my downloads?