David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165 (2007)
An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our attitude as belief, desire, hope, etc., without presupposing some sort of recognition process. The criticism can be answered, but only by giving up a tacit—and wholly unnecessary—assumption that has influenced discussions of ascent routines. Abandoning the assumption allows a different account of ARs that avoids the criticism and even provides an algorithm for finding a corresponding lower level utterance for any PA. The account I give is supported by research on children’s first uses of a propositional attitude vocabulary
|Keywords||Self-ascription Simulation theory Beliefs Propositional attitudes|
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References found in this work BETA
L. Jonathan Cohen (1989). Belief and Acceptance. Mind 98 (391):367-389.
A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.
John Michael (2012). Mirror Systems and Simulation: A Neo-Empiricist Interpretation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):565-582.
Ciano Aydin (forthcoming). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the 'Inside–Outside' Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
Neil C. Manson (2012). First-Person Authority: An Epistemic-Pragmatic Account. Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.
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