David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165 (2007)
An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our attitude as belief, desire, hope, etc., without presupposing some sort of recognition process. The criticism can be answered, but only by giving up a tacit—and wholly unnecessary—assumption that has influenced discussions of ascent routines. Abandoning the assumption allows a different account of ARs that avoids the criticism and even provides an algorithm for finding a corresponding lower level utterance for any PA. The account I give is supported by research on children’s first uses of a propositional attitude vocabulary
|Keywords||Self-ascription Simulation theory Beliefs Propositional attitudes|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Marilyn Shatz, Henry M. Wellman & Sharon Silber (1983). The Acquisition of Mental Verbs: A Systematic Investigation of the First Reference to Mental State. Cognition 14 (3):301-321.
Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy (2003). What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
Citations of this work BETA
David James Barnett (2016). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). Unwitting Self‐Awareness? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):719-726.
Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
Ciano Aydin (2015). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation À la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.
Similar books and articles
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
Eoghan Mac Aogáin (1998). Imitation Without Attitudes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):696-697.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Against Essential Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Reinhard Muskens (1993). Propositional Attitudes. In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press
John Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
Robert J. Matthews (2007/2010). The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution. Oxford University Press.
Sean Crawford (2008). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited. Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.
Franz Dietrich Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads86 ( #48,118 of 1,796,357 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #168,770 of 1,796,357 )
How can I increase my downloads?