Back through the looking glass: On the relationship between intentions and indexicals

Philosophical Studies 124 (3):295 - 312 (2005)
Donnellan and Predelli have both responded to accusations that in virtue of involving intentions in their accounts of reference they are committed to ‘Humpty Dumpty’ theories of reference. I examine their responses and argue that they do not succeed in escaping this accusation. Corazza et al. (2002) propose an alternative to Predelli’s account involving linguistic conventions instead of intentions. I argue that Predelli’s responses to Corazza et al. are unsatisfactory and that the intentional theorist is obliged either to accept the Humpty Dumpty conclusion or to adopt the conventional picture, thus relegating intentions to a less significant role in their reference theory.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David Kaplan (1989). Demonstratives. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 481-563.
Geoffrey Nunberg (1993). Indexicality and Deixis. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (1):1--43.
David Kaplan (1989). Afterthoughts. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 565-614.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

50 ( #95,761 of 1,932,507 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #132,735 of 1,932,507 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.