Nagasawa vs. Nagel: Omnipotence, pseudo-tasks, and a recent discussion of Nagel's doubts about physicalism
Inquiry 48 (5):436 – 447 (2005)
|Abstract||In his recent "Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument", Yujin Nagasawa interprets Thomas Nagel as making a certain argument against physicalism and objects that this argument transgresses a principle, laid down by Thomas Aquinas, according to which inability to perform a pseudo-task does not count against an omnipotence claim. Taking Nagasawa's interpretation of Nagel for granted, I distinguish different kinds of omnipotence claims and different kinds of pseudo-tasks, and on that basis show that Nagasawa's criticism of Nagel is unsuccessful. I also show how his reflections do nonetheless point to a limitation of the approach he means to criticize.|
|Keywords||Nagel's Bat Argument Pseudo-Tasks Omnipotence|
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