On substantial independence: a reply to Patrick Toner

Philosophical Studies 159 (2):293-297 (2012)
Abstract
Patrick Toner has recently criticized accounts of substance provided by Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, and the author, accounts which say (to a first approximation) that substances cannot depend on things other than their own parts. On Toner’s analysis, the inclusion of this parts exception results in a disjunctive definition of substance rather than a unified account. In this paper (speaking only for myself, but in a way that would, I believe, support the other authors that Toner discusses), I first make clear what Toner’s criticism is, and then I respond to it. Including the parts exception is not the adding of a second condition but instead the creation of a new single condition. Since it is not the adding of a condition, the result is not disjunctive. Therefore, the objection fails.
Keywords Substance  Parts  Independence  Ontology  Metaphysics
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References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (1995). Ontological Dependence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:269 - 290.
Michael Gorman (2006). Independence and Substance. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):147-159.
E. J. Lowe (1994). Ontological Dependency. Philosophical Papers 23 (1):31-48.
Review author[S.]: E. J. Lowe (1994). Primitive Substances. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):531-552.

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