Reason explanations and counterfactuals
|Abstract||In evaluating conditionals concerning what a person would have done in counterfactual circumstances, we suppose the counterfactual antecedent to be true, just as in what I loosely term the standard "Ramsey" procedure; but then we follow a different path--a simulative path--in evaluating the consequent. The simulative path imposes an implicit restriction on possible worlds, a procedural guarantee that the individual simulated is aware of or knows about the counterfactual condition. This difference makes clear the way in which reason explanations are implicitly cognitive and psychological|
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Alan Penczek (1997). Counterfactuals with True Components. Erkenntnis 46 (1):79-85.
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Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
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