Subjectivism about normativity and the normativity of intentional states

Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only a status relative to the imposition of a norm. If one rejects this view of mind-to-world states, then one has grounds for rejecting SN itself. If one accepts it, an infinite regress arises that makes it impossible for norms to be imposed, which means that SN has undermined itself
Keywords Intentionality  Mental States  Normativity  Philosophy  Subjectivism
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DOI 10.5840/ipq200343153
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PhilPapers Archive Michael Gorman, Subjectivism about normativity and the normativity of intentional states
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