Talking about intentional objects

Dialectica 60 (2):135-144 (2006)
Abstract
Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
Keywords Existence  Intentional  Metaphysics  Object  Truth  Crane, Tim
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