David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 18 (3):276–289 (2005)
The distinction between the essential and the accidental characteristics of a thing should be understood not in modal terms (the received view) nor in definitional terms (Fine’s recent proposal) but as follows: an essential characteristic of a thing is one that is not explained by any other of that thing’s characteristics, and an accidental characteristic of a thing is one that is so explained. Various versions of this proposal can be formulated.
|Keywords||Essential and Accidental Characteristics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Skiles (2015). Essence in Abundance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):100-112.
David S. Oderberg (2011). Essence and Properties. Erkenntnis 75 (1):85-111.
Patrick Toner (2008). Emergent Substance. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):281 - 297.
Fabrice Correia (2012). On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):639-653.
Fabrice Correia (2007). (Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality. Dialectica 61 (1):63–84.
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