David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 25:437-458 (2000)
Many philosophers believe that the main reason it is wrong to kill people is that killing them deprives them of all the experiences and activities that would otherwise have constituted their futures. Some of these philosophers have also argued that killing potential people is wrong for the same reason, and have used this as support for a conservative position on abortion. Critics have countered by arguing that if zygotes are potential people so too are gamete pairs, and that the potentialist is therefore committed to saying that contraception is very seriously wrong.The first part of this paper examines critically three potentia!ist lines of defense against the (above) contraception reductio and argues that they all fail. The second part of the paper discusses three attempts to finger the flaw in the (above) deprivation argument that is used by the potentialist, and points to significant problems facing each attempt. It concludes that while there is good reason to believe the potentialist’s deprivation argument is unsound, the flaw in the argument has not yet been convincingly identified
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Don Berkich (2007). A Fallacy in Potentiality. Dialogue 46 (1):137-150.
Similar books and articles
Patrick A. Tully (2005). Victims of Abortion and “Victims” of Contraception. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:383-398.
C. Strong (2008). A Critique of “the Best Secular Argument Against Abortion”. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (10):727-731.
Marco Stier & Bettina Schoene-Seifert (2013). The Argument From Potentiality in the Embryo Protection Debate: Finally “Depotentialized”? American Journal of Bioethics 13 (1):19-27.
Julie Zahle (2003). The Individualism-Holism Debate on Intertheoretic Reduction and the Argument From Multiple Realization. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):77-99.
Robert F. Card (2007). Conscientious Objection and Emergency Contraception. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (6):8 – 14.
Simo Vehmas (2002). Is It Wrong to Deliberately Conceive or Give Birth to a Child with Mental Retardation? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):47 – 63.
Robin Findlay Hendry & Paul Needham (2007). Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):339 - 353.
Alex Orenstein (2009). Ontological Arguments. Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):47-66.
John Schwenkler (2010). Michael Dummett on the Morality of Contraception. Heythrop Journal 53 (5):763-767.
Gilbert Plumer (1991). Kant's Neglected Argument Against Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):501-520.
Rik Peels (2013). Are Naturalism and Moral Realism Incompatible? Religious Studies (1):1-10.
Jonathan Way (2012). Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason. Ethics 122 (3):489-515.
A. Giubilini (2012). Abortion and the Argument From Potential: What We Owe to the Ones Who Might Exist. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):49-59.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads13 ( #141,570 of 1,692,645 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #181,401 of 1,692,645 )
How can I increase my downloads?