More Aristotelian Pleasures

Abstract
FIRST A CRITIQUE OF G E L OWEN'S VERSION OF THE CONTRAST BETWEEN BOOKS VII AND X OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. IT IS ARGUED THAT BOTH BOOKS ARE OFFERING SIMILAR ACCOUNTS OF THE NATURE OF PLEASURE, WHICH OFFER GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF PLEASURE. HOWEVER, ARISTOTLE IS INTERESTED IN 'REAL' PLEASURE, WHICH IS RELATED TO THE NATURE OF THE RELEVANT BEING. ONLY BY IMPLICATION DOES HE GIVE A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF PLEASURE. THE BOOK X VERSION ENABLES HIM TO HAVE A VIEW OF PLEASURE THAT PRESERVES THE TRUTH IN BOTH HEDONISM AND PLATONIC CRITICISMS OF IT.
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