Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):193-194 (2002)
|Abstract||Pylyshyn raises hot topics like the number and kinds of pictorialist theories there are and their explanatory power. Pylyshyn states that pictorialists have only two possibilities – they can posit either “only functional” images or “really spatial” images – and that neither of these possibilities is convincing or sufficient in explanatory power for empirical and theoretical reasons. Is pictorialism, in principle, untenable?|
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