Online research in philosophy

Why should we deliberate? I discuss a Kantian response to this query and argue that we cannot as rational beings avoid deliberation in principle; and that we have good reasons to consider the value and strength of Kant's philosophical investigations concerning fundamental moral issues and their relevance for the question of why we ought to deliberate. I also argue that deliberation is a wide duty. This means that it has to be set as an end, that it is meritorious, and that we cannot specify exactly what acts can be identified with it or are required for its realization. I begin by discussing why we cannot avoid deliberation in principle, that deliberation is a wide duty and why we ought to set it as an end. In the second part I argue how deliberation can be acknowledged in cosmopolitan education, and how we can inquire into the quality of communication in terms of deliberation in such an education or elsewhere.

This essay uses John Dewey's understanding of classroom discussion to construct a model of democratic deliberation that stresses the importance of the formal aesthetics of dialog. It claims that qualities such as the rhythm and direction of face-to-face political talk affects interlocutors' effectiveness in persuading others and stimulating interest. Because participants primarily focus on responding to the substance of individual utterances, the model employs Dewey's understanding of the teacher as a moderator who regulates the spatial and temporal quality of the entire deliberation. Although some might claim the presence of such an authority figure endangers the deliberators' autonomy, Dewey stresses that good teachers assist students in constructing their own solutions to their own problems, and therefore a moderator could actively intervene and respect the normative principles of deliberative democracy. Finally, the essay discusses the distinctive role implied by such an association in a larger theory of deliberative politics.

The ballot is, as often said, a substitute for bullets. But what is more significant is that counting of heads compels prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion, while the essence of appeal to force is to cut short resort to such methods. Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it never is merely majority rule.There have been two distinguished critics who declare great admiration for Dewey's work and yet are constrained to say they find it essentially defective. Both Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson have reluctantly judged that Dewey's ethical theory fails at decisive points.In this paper, I argue that many recent interpretations ..

Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy (e.g. Prichard, Dancy, McDowell) hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.

Abstract: Practical deliberation is deliberation concerning what to do governed by norms on intention (e.g. means-end coherence and consistency), which are taken to be a mark of rational deliberation. According to the theory of practical deliberation I develop in this paper we should think of the norms of rational practical deliberation ecologically: that is, the norms that constitute rational practical deliberation depend on the complex interaction between the psychological capacities of the agent in question and the agent's environment. I argue that this view does a better job of justifying particular norms for practical deliberation than intrinsic or constitutivist theories. Finally, I argue against the Myth Theory of deliberation, which takes there to be no such norms on deliberation.

Introduction -- Dewey and the problem of intellectual retrieval -- Avoiding the criticism : Dewey's darwinian enlightenment -- Redirection : religious certainty and the quest for meaning -- The plan of this book -- Part I: From certainty to contingency -- Protestant self-assertion and spiritual sickness -- Dewey's evasion of Protestant self-assertion and spiritual sickness -- Darwin, science, and the moral economy of self and society -- Hodge and the problem of human agency in the wake of evolution -- Reconciliation and the quest for certainty -- Dewey and the meaningfulness of modern life -- Agency and inquiry after Darwin -- Inquiry and phronemacrosis : Dewey's modified aristotelianism -- Theory, practice, and the quest for certainty -- The experience of living : action and the primacy of contingency -- Contingency and the place of intelligent action -- Part II: Religion, the moral life, and democracy -- Faith and democratic piety -- Democratic self-reliance : Emerson, Dewey, and Niebuhr -- Reading a common faith -- Within the space of moral reflection -- The moral life and the place of conflict -- The expanded self : deliberation, imagination, and sympathy -- The tragic self : deliberation and conflict -- Constraining elites and managing power -- The danger of political pessimism : between Lippmann and Wolin -- Employing and legitimizing power -- The permanence of contingency : on the precarious and stable public.

Sunstein represents moral heuristics as rigid rules that lead us to jump to moral conclusions, and contrasts them with reflective moral deliberation, which he represents as independent of heuristics and capable of supplanting them. Following John Dewey's psychology of moral judgment, I argue that successful moral deliberation does not supplant moral heuristics but uses them flexibly as inputs to deliberation. Many of the flaws in moral judgment that Sunstein attributes to heuristics reflect instead the limitations of the deliberative context in which people are asked to render judgments.

Most contemporary deliberative democrats contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement and collective action. A critical mass of political theorists committed to the value of democratic deliberation also claims that John Dewey's writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Unfortunately, very few commentators have noted the similarities between Dewey and Robert Goodin's theories of deliberation, as well as the surprising contrast between their modeling of deliberation and the predominant view in the deliberative democracy literature. Both Dewey and Robert Goodin have advanced theories of deliberation which emphasize the value of internal, monological or individual deliberative procedures, rather than external, dialogical and group ones. What distinguishes Goodin and Dewey's conceptions of deliberation is that Dewey's concerns the psychological activity of imagining possible ways to solve moral problems, whereas Goodin's pertains to the process of internal consideration that precedes political dialogue and decision making, or 'deliberation within.' Despite this difference, Dewey's theory of moral deliberation appears to share more in common with Goodin's account of deliberation within than with the dialogical models widely embraced by contemporary deliberative democrats. So, if deliberative theorists truly want to appropriate Dewey's model of moral deliberation, then, I argue, they ought to reconsider Goodin's alternative (monological) account as a pragmatic strategy for sustaining the deliberative turn in democratic theory.

In James Gouinlock's essay "Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation," he argues that Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson's criticisms of John Dewey's ethical theory are based upon fundamental misinterpretations of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation. In this paper, I attempt, in the spirit of Gouinlock's 1978 essay, to widen and enrich the discussion of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation by relating it to a claim of political philosophers and theorists that is recently in vogue, namely, that Dewey's writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic theorists contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement and collective action. If Deweyan democracy is identified with deliberative democracy, do Dewey scholars risk making Dewey's democratic vision a useless relic for theorizing about democracy in the wake of the deliberative turn? The paper is organized into four sections. In the first, I summarize the positions of those scholars defending the view that John Dewey was a proto-deliberative democrat, in effect anticipating the deliberative turn in democratic theory. The second section examines Gouinlock's thesis that despite White and Stevenson's mistaken accounts, Dewey offered a distinctive and insightful way of understanding moral judgment. In the third section, my analysis reveals the political dimension of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation. The fourth and concluding section explores the lesson that my analysis might impart to commentators enamored with the idea that Dewey's vision of democracy is essentially deliberative.