David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4):573-590 (1989)
It is usually assumed that what Lewis says about the given in Mind and the World-Order (MWO) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV) is essentially the same, and that both works are defenses of foundationalism. However, this assumption faces two problems: first, it is difficult to bring Lewis's diverse remarks on the given into coherence, especially when those in MWO are compared with those in AKV; and second, though AKV is a defense of foundationalism, there is much in MWO that can be read as a critique of foundationalism. In this paper a different reading of Lewis is proposed, one that avoids these problems. This is developed by going farther back in Lewis, to his Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, The Place of Intuition in Knowledge (PIK). By tracing Lewis's discussion of the given from PIK through MWO up to AKV, it is shown that the phrase 'the given' is used to refer to two different doctrines, and that Lewis's position on foundationalism undergoes a fundamental change, roughly, from indifference to rejection to acceptance
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Sinclair (2012). Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):335-355.
Aude Bandini (2012). Le Mythe Fondateur de L’Empirisme : Le Donné Épistémologique. [REVIEW] Dialogue 51 (3):341-371.
Similar books and articles
William Maker (2006). Hegel and Rorty, or, How Hegel Saves Pragmatism From Itself. The Owl of Minerva 37 (2):99-125.
C. S. Jenkins (2006). Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism. Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
Justin Cruickshank (2007). The Usefulness of Fallibilism in Post-Positivist Philosophy: A Popperian Critique of Critical Realism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3):263-288.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
Joe Frank Jones (1998). A Modest Realism. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2-3):5-21.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
Christopher W. Gowans (1984). C. I. Lewis's Critique of Foundationalism in Mind and the World-Order. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 20 (3):241 - 252.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #83,131 of 1,902,709 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #99,313 of 1,902,709 )
How can I increase my downloads?