Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity
In Marcelo Suarez, Miklos Redei & Mauro Dorato (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Kluwer (2009)
| Abstract | In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. Is properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated. | |||||||||
| Keywords | identity theory Kripke | |||||||||
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