Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity

In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa. Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer 119-127 (2010)
In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
Keywords identity theory  Kripke
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