Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity

In Marcelo Suarez, Miklos Redei & Mauro Dorato (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Kluwer (2009)
Abstract
In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
Keywords identity theory  Kripke
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