The Beliefs of Mute Animals
In Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind. Kluwer (2007)
| Abstract | In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does not allow for some minimal form of co referential failure. | |||||||||
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Robert Garner (2012). Much Ado About Nothing?: Barry, Justice and Animals. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (3):363-376.
David Owens (2009). Freedom and Practical Judgement. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
R. Routley (1982). Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs, and Intentionality, to Animals. Inquiry 24 (4):385-417.
David Martel Johnson (1988). Brutes Believe Not. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):279-294.
Manuel Bremer (2007). Methodologische Überlegungen Zu Tierischen Überzeugungen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2).
Leslie F. Stevenson (2002). Six Levels of Mentality. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.
Manuel Bremer (2007). Methodologische Überlegungen Zu Tierischen Überzeugungen / Methodological Reflections on Exploring Beliefs in Animals. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):347 - 355.
F. Dreckmann (1999). Animal Beliefs and Their Contents. Erkenntnis 51 (1):597-615.
Simone Gozzano (1997). Theory of Mind and the Ontology of Belief. Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August):145-156.
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