Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties
In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press (2012)
| Abstract | In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the type-identity theory. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Type Identity phenomenal properties | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMarkus I. Eronen (forthcoming). Hypothetical Identities: Explanatory Problems for the Explanatory Argument. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
Don Merrell (2011). Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
John Zeimbekis (2009). Phenomenal and Objective Size. Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
J.-B. Blumenfeld (1985). Phenomenal Properties and the Identity Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (December):485-93.
Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
John Zeimbekis (forthcoming). Digital Pictures, Sampling and Vagueness (The Ontology of Digital Pictures). Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
Jaegwon Kim (1972). Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws and the Identity Theory. The Monist 56 (April):178-92.
Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter & E. W. Prior (1982). Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories. Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.
Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
Michael Pauen (2002). Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):37-49.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).
Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.
Jakob Hohwy (2011). Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation. Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.
Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-10-05Total downloads8 ( #124,608 of 556,895 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #16,193 of 556,895 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
