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|Abstract||In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn a language but finds the validity of his own argument in jeopardy.|
|Keywords||Chinese Room Consciousness Semantics Searle, John R|
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