An anti-epistemicist consequence of Margin for error semantics for knowledge

Abstract
Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator ‘it is known that’. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. We know that any man with zero hairs is bald. And it also does not seem completely implausible that we know that we know it, and that we know that we know that we know it, and so on.
Keywords vagueness  higher-order vagueness  epistemicism  margin for error
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2005). Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):468–491.
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