Are all preferences nosy?

Res Publica 6 (2):133-154 (2000)
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Abstract

The significance which any human action carries for normative reasoning is held to include its causal preconditions as well as its causal consequences. That claim is defended against a series of natural objections. The point is then extended from actions to preferences via discussion of Barry and Dworkin. The grounds for excluding nosy preferences from aggregation must involve appeal not just to rights and intention but also to the consequences of acting on them. But then some of the features in virtue of which nosy preferences are held to be objectionable will also be present in any other preference.

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