Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82 (2008)
|Abstract||David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.|
|Keywords||Compatibilism Incompatibilism Free Will Ability|
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