David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):388-409 (2014)
In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ-ing just in case, in φ-ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the attitudes we bear, and our mental orientation, toward people and other objects of significant moral worth. These requirements embody the moral stricture that we accord to these others a sufficient level of respect, one that their moral worth demands. This is a familiar theme which has its roots in P. F. Strawson’s pioneering views on moral responsibility. My development of it leads me to the conclusion that acting wrongly is not a condition of blameworthiness: violating a moral requirement to perform, or refrain from performing, an action is neither necessary nor sufficient for being blameworthy. All we are ever blameworthy for, I will argue, are certain aspects of our mental bearing toward others. We can be said to be blameworthy for our actions only derivatively, in the sense that those actions are the natural manifestations of the things for which we are strictly speaking blameworthy
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1979). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
R. Jay Wallace (1996). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Harvard University Press.
Peter F. Strawson (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1-25.
Angela M. Smith (2005). Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life. Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
Gary Watson (ed.) (2003). Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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