Can a Libertarian Hold that Our Free Acts are Caused by God?

Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):22-44 (2010)
Abstract
According to prevailing opinion, if a creaturely act is caused by God, then it cannot be free in the libertarian sense. I argue to the contrary. I distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic models of divine causal agency. I then show that, given the extrinsic model, there is no reason one holding that our free acts are caused by God could not also hold a libertarian account of human freedom. It follows that a libertarian account of human freedom is consistent with God’s being the source and cause of all being apart from himself, including the being of free human actions
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