David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):85-97 (1994)
Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.
|Keywords||Progress evolutionary epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
Larry Laudan (1984). Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. University of California Press.
David L. Hull (1988). Science as a Process an Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. University of Chicago Press.
David Zaret (1977). The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 90 (1):146-149.
Michael Ruse (1986/1998). Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy. Prometheus Books.
Stephen Edelston Toulmin (1972). Human Understanding. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Philip Mirowski (1996). The Economic Consequences of Philip Kitcher. Social Epistemology 10 (2):153 – 169.
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