Does science have a “global goal?”: A critique of Hull's view of conceptual progress [Book Review]

Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):85-97 (1994)
Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.
Keywords Progress  evolutionary epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/BF00849916
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Edelston Toulmin (1972). Human Understanding. Princeton, N.J.,Princeton University Press.

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Barbara Gabriella Renzi (2009). A Type Hierarchy of Selection Processes for the Evaluation of Evolutionary Analogies. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):311 - 336.
Brent D. Mishler (1990). Phylogenetic Analogies in the Conceptual Development of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:225 - 235.

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