Discussion. Structural similarity of structuralism? Comments on Priest's analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference
Graduate studies at Western
Mind 107 (428):823-834 (1998)
|Abstract||that all the paradoxes of set theory and logic fall under one schema; and (2) hence they should be solved by one kind of solution. This reply addresses both claims, and counters that (1) in fact at least one paradox escapes the schema, and also some apparently 'safe' theorems fall within it; and (2) even for the (considerable) range of paradoxes so captured by the schema, the assumption of a common solution is not obvious; each paradox surely depends upon the theory and context in which it arises. Details of Priest's proposed solution are also sought.|
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